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1INTRODUCTION
Devolution is regarded as the strongest form of decentralization. Under this model, authority is
transferred to sub-national elected governments, which are accountable to the population of
their territories. In the Georgian context successful devolution process has twofold importance:
On the one hand, it puts into practice the implementation of democratic institutional building
declared by the Constitution, on the other hand, it possesses robust mechanisms for conflict
prevention, vital to divided societies such as Georgia.1
Devolved local government has a short history in Georgia. The system of local government has
always been integrated into larger and often centralized system of bigger units such as the
Russian Empire and USSR. The only exclusion is the short-lived Georgian Republic of 1918-21,
but this was not long enough for the establishment of local government traditions. Therefore
Georgia started building the self-government system from scratch in the 90s, simultaneously
with the building of independent nation-state institutions.
The introduction of local government institutions took place when there had been long traditions
of decision-making patterns, both formal and informal. Observing institutional building in
transitional countries, many ‘transitologists’ concluded that suitability of the institutions depends
on the environment and as the environment changes in unpredictable ways, efficiency of the
borrowed institutions in the short run may turn into inefficiency in the long run.2
One can argue that this wisdom has been completely ignored during the decentralization
process in Georgia. The process started a decade ago, but there is insufficient progress in the
development of local institutions as it is indicated in the survey results that studied public
attitudes towards local governments. The key findings of the survey show that citizens feel they
are underrepresented in local governance processes, they have a low understanding of the
structure and functions of local government and low trust in local officials.3 Another recent
survey in three districts demonstrates that only 23 % of respondents has shown an awareness
of local governments’ activities.4 The main reason of the poor institutional performance of local
governments and low level of participation is attributed to the low capacity of the local
institutions, such as lack of technical experience, inadequate budget, poor revenue sources,
and inappropriate organizational structure.
I argue that, exclusive concern with technical matters distracted attention from political factors,
political culture, and policy networks existing at the localities. The main objective of this paper is
to identify focal points of institutional innovations that will lead to participatory governance in
non-homogenous communities. The central argument of the paper is that existing practices of
policy-making must be taking into consideration while devolving power to the local institutions.
Thus, to achieve the main objective the paper analyses the role of local policy networks in the
policy outcomes of local governments.
The paper consists of five parts. The first part addresses the question of theoretical background
and outlines research design. The second part describes formal structures of Georgian local
government before and after the institutional reform of 2002. The third part develops indicators
for the institutional performance and descries how local governments perform. The fourth part
analyses policy networks and offers network explanation to institutional performance. The last,
fifth part reviews the models of participation and concludes with recommendations for
participatory governance.
1 Ethnic and civil conflicts in Georgia of 1990s are analyzed in Sleider, D. (1997) Democratization in Georgia. In Dawisha, K., and
Parott, B. (Eds.). Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and Caucasus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2 Grabher, G., and Stark, D. (1998) Organizing Diversity: Evolutionary Theory, Network Analysis and Post-Socialism. In Pickles,
J., and Smith, A. (Eds.). Theorizing Transition: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformations. London and New
York: Routledge.
3 Survey commissioned by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in 2001. (unpublished).
4 Survey conducted by public opinion research company GORBI in July 2002 (unpublished).
21. THEORY AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Theoretical background
The theoretical background of this research proposal is a combination of institutionalism and
network theory. The integrated model of institutionalism claims that institutions have regulative,
normative and cognitive pillars that are supported by cultures, social structures and routines.5
Institutions are constantly changing by the logic of bricolage, e.g. they are rebuilt using the ruins
of existing institutions rather than on the ruins of destroyed ones. This process gives a constant
legitimacy to the institutions.6
The network theory sees an actor as embedded in structures of relations. It aims to study these
relations rather to analyse social entities such as individual actors, social groups, organizations,
etc. The research relies on the understanding of policy networks as tool of interest
intermediation between the public and private spheres.7 The paper claims that policy outcomes
of public institutions are largely determined by the structure of the interest intermediation, i.e. by
the structure of policy networks.
From the position of an individual actor, institutions have twofold functions: The first, institutions
constitute both “logic of appropriateness,” which creates the frameworks for the individual
interpretation of rules, identities and alternatives, and ‘logic of consequentality’, e.g. framework
for the goal oriented, rational action.8 The second, institutions still leave a choice for individuals.
Being socialized in different environments, an actor develops multiple, often competing
identities. As a result, both the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and the ‘logic of consequentiality’
constituted by the institutions can have manifold and competing meanings depending on actor’s
position in the network he/she is embedded in. Thus, to understand an action guided by the
institutions, one should analyze the network position of the actor.
Institutions are changing both formally and informally. The formal change is initiated and guided
by the state through changes in regulations and legislation. What effect does a formal change
have for the policy outcomes? The first expectation of the paper argues that institutional change
reshapes the structure of networks and this has an effect on policy outcomes. Figure 1
schematically describes this expectation:
Figure 1. Expected effect of institutional change on policy outcomes.
Local government jurisdictions are composed of variety cliques of policy networks. The actors
within each clique are public and private organizations as well as individuals. These actors
interact with each other in the process of policy/decision-making. As elected local government is
newly established institution, it is likely that bureaucracy dominated cliques still play very
significant role at the localities. The second expectation is that policy and decisions at the local
level are made through the interaction of hierarchically structured cliques. There are two key
components for policy-making that are channeled through the ties among the cliques –
information and resources. Starting from the influential work of Mark Granovetter, It is argued
5 Scott, W.R. (1995) Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
6 Lanzara, G. F. (1998) Self-destructive Processes in Institution Building and some Modest Countervailing Mechanisms.
European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1), 29.
7 Marsh, D. (1998) The Development of Policy Network Approach. In D. Marsh (Ed.). Comparing Policy Networks. Philadelphia
PA: Open University Press.
8 March, J., and Olsen, J. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational basis of Politics. New York: Free Press, 160.
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3that information and resources flow differently depending on strengthens or weakness of these
ties.9 Strong tie implies trust, closeness and interdependence of actors, while weak tie refers to
more superficial contact or acquaintance. Granovetter’s argument is that through weak ties
closed and homogenous cliques are bridged and this facilitates exchange between the cliques.
For local governments to perform well it is crucial to receive timely and reliable information from
the bureaucrats. From this view the research expects that the weaker the ties between the main
cliques the higher the level of local government’s performance.
Research design
The main units of analysis of the paper are policy domains in pilot municipalities. According to
Lauman and Knoke (1987) policy domain is a set of actors with major concerns about a
substantive area, whose preferences and actions on policy events must be taken into account
by the other dominant participants.10 But, policy domains are not legally recognized entities with
clear-cut boundaries. It is a constructed unit of analysis, which has four main components:
actors, policy interests, power relations and collective actions.11 Normally, policy domains are
constructed to analyze policy making in certain sectors like health, environment or education.
For our purpose policy domain is given territorial dimension, i.e. those actors will be analyzed
whose interest and influence is important at the localities. In this view, choosing municipal
domains enables us to take into account variety of actors on both national and local levels.
Table 1. Description of municipal policy domains
Elements Examples
Actors
o Local government institutions
o Central government institutions
o Interest groups
o Formal sectors
o Individual actors
Policy interests
o Issues
o Events
Power relations
o Information exchange
o Resource exchange
Collective actions
o Mobilization
o Publicity
o Lobbying
Councils, city governments, local departments/services
Regional and district administrations, local branches of ministries
Non- governmental organizations, business groups
Health and educational organizations
Councillors, mayors, members of parliament, businessmen, regional appointed officials
Municipal competences, service delivery, control of funds
Local elections, legislation, regulations
Ideas, data, strategies, advice
Funds, facilities, votes
Coalition building
Briefings in media
Connections with elected and appointed officials
Adapted from Knoke, D., Pappi, F.U., Broadbent, J., Tsujinaka, Y. (1999). Comparing Policy Networks. Labor Politics
in the U.S., Germany, and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Some scholars of power networks argue that formal organizations are the key players rather
than individuals and therefore, interorganizational networks matter more than interpersonal
ties.12 From that perspective only organizations and organizational actors are analyzed in policy
9 Granovetter, M. S.(1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78.
10 Edward O. Lauman, E.O., and Knoke, D. (1987). The Organizational State. Social Choice in National Public Domains.
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987.
11 Knoke, D., Pappi, F.U., Broadbent, J., Tsujinaka, Y. (1999). Comparing Policy Networks. Labor Politics in the U.S., Germany,
and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 11.
12 Knoke, D. (1994). Networks of Elite Structure and Decision Making. In Wasserman S., and Galaskiewicz, J. (Eds.). Advances
in Social Network Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 290.
4domains and individuals are paid no attention. This argument is mainly based on the data from
advanced western democracies. In the context of less democratic, transitional country individual
actors and interpersonal connections are so strong that they frequently beoame driving forces
for policy networks. Based on this argument table 1 describes four main components of
municipal policy domain.
The research has been conducted in three pilot municipalities. The municipalities have been
selected based on the following criteria: (1) Existence of sharp ethnic or political divisions; (2)
Urban settlement and administrative centers of districts; (3) Plurality of interests, i.e. reasonably
developed media, voluntary and business sectors. One of the selected cities, Akhaltsikhe, has
ethnic divisions13 and two, Gori and Khashuri are with political divisions. Table 2 shows the
results of local elections in 1998 by party lists, which indicates political differences in electorate.
Table 2. Results of local elections in pilot municipalities by parties, 1998
Gori Khashuri AkhaltsikheCities
Parties Votes % Seats Votes % Seats Votes % Seats
Citizens Union 4440 28.64 8 1893 24.03 6 2609 46.58 12
Revival 1215 7.84 1 519 6.59 1 - - -
People’s Party 3150 20.32 6 568 7.21 1 793 14.19 3
National Democrats 1329 857 1 411 5.22 1 - - -
Socialist party - - - 2005 25.45 7 - - -
Labour party 2130 13.74 4 1153 14.64 3 1271 22.72 4
Source: Lominadze, J. (1999) Elections of Local Representative Bodies in Georgia. Tbilisi.
The research was conducted in several phases. In the first phase legislative acts concerning
local government were studied and internal structures of the municipalities were reviewed. The
second phase was dedicated to the gathering and analysis of all normative acts of local councils
and executive bodies in pilot municipalities. The third phase started with observing connections
and alliances during the pre election campaigns in May 2002 and continued with the two series
of interviews with actors of the municipal policy domains.
The review of the internal structure of municipalities and preliminary meetings with local officials
revealed that local governments saw the structure of their jurisdictions divided into education,
health, business, voluntary and government sectors. Thus, two series of semi-structured in-
depth interviews were conducted with representatives of these sectors, who occupied high
leadership positions in their organizations. These actors are referred to in the paper as key
stakeholders. The interview questions were grouped around the four theoretical questions: (1)
evaluation of local government’s activities under the old and new systems; (2) assessment of
the impact of institutional innovations; (3) Participation in decision-making process; (4)
Connections and ties relevant to policy-making in municipal policy domains. Annex 1 shows the
main questions of the interviews.
2. FORMAL POWER STRUCTURES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Evolution of local government
Georgia declared the restoration of the independent nation-state on 9 April 1991. From the very
start of independence, the introduction of local government has been highly debated. The
results of this debate have always been controversial. The first parliament (1990-91) made the
first steps towards reform. They introduced elected councils on the level of village, temi (two or
more amalgamated villages), town, city and district (Raion). But the reform was supported
neither by the opposition nor by the public, as the supervisory power over the elected bodies
13 The city is populated by the Georgian and Armenian ethnic groups. Different sources estimate ethnic Armenians differently:
from 35 to 45 % of total population.
5was granted to the Prefect, who was appointed by the President of Republic. As expected, the
Prefect secured all executive power and the elected officials were not able to exercise their
functions. Therefore, the first steps towards the reform can not be seen as successful.
After the military coup of January 1992 and the collapse of newly built nation-state institutions,
the new ruling force (the Military Council) abolished the institution of Prefect. However, the
elected councils were not able to continue functioning in the dramatically changing environment
and ended up in self-liquidation. To fill the institutional gap at localities the Head of State
introduced the practice of appointing heads of distinct administrations (Gamgebeli) in 1992. This
institution grabbed overwhelming power on the local level. The reason was twofold: On the one
hand, the absence of elected councils meant that there was no mechanisms for public control,
and, on the other, the extremely weak state was not capable of controlling and monitoring local
administration either.
The capacity of the central government was limited because of the lack of statehood traditions,
the civil war and the rapid economic turndown. After the military coup part of the territories were
under the control of the supporters of ex president. The de facto central government had neither
capacity nor human resources to complete district governments with loyal cadres. As a
response to these difficulties the head of state introduced a position of the Presidential
Representative in regions. Later, the constitution confirmed that the president had right to
appoint his representative for various purposes. This article had been used to draw boundaries
of regions based on the historical-ethnographic traditions. However, regions are recognized as
territorial unit neither by the constitution nor by any laws. The controversy between the
constitution and the existing reality has been debated for a long time within the parliament. The
president’s solution was to appoint his representative in several districts jointly, creating de facto
a region. Thus, the Presidential Representative became responsible for all state matters in the
regions. Although there was no hierarchical relationship established by legislation between the
Presidential Representative and local government bodies, the Representative maintained quite
a few mechanisms to control and dominate local governments.
The second parliament (1992-95) tried to continue the democratic reforms of local governments.
A law was drafted but the parliament considered and approved it only on the first hearing and
failed to progress further. The reason of this failure was the then dominant discourse in the
political elite, which considered local government reform as one component of the territorial-
administrative organization of the country. But territorial-administrative changes were believed
to happen only after the restoration of jurisdiction over the lost territories. These territories were
the former Ossetian Autonomous Okrug and the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic. The
Ossetian autonomy was abolished by the first parliament in 1990 and this was followed by an
armed conflict between the ethnic Georgians and Ossetians. As a result the Okrug announced
independence from the Georgian state and the Russian peacekeeping forces kept this status
quo. The Abkhazian Autonomous Republic announced its independence after the Georgian
governmental army was defeated in the civil war of 1991-93. The politicians considered the
territorial-administrative arrangement as an outcome of political bargaining between the
Georgian state and the leadership of territories out of Georgian control.
This approach is reflected in the constitution of 1995, which declares that territorial-
administrative division of the country would be designed by a constitutional law after the
restoration of Georgian territorial unity. But the constitution stated that citizens of Georgia may
manage local public affairs by elected self-governments without violation of national
sovereignty. The constitution also declared that local government system and responsibilities
would be regulated by the organic law, which stands higher in the Georgian legislative hierarchy
then regular laws.
It took the third Parliament two years to reach agreement on the system of local governments.
Finally, in 1997, the Organic Law on Local Government and Administration was adopted and in
October of 1998 the first local elections was held. The organic law established two tier system
6of sub national government: first tier in villages, towns and cities incorporated into districts and
second tier in territorial units – districts. In six big cities not incorporated into districts unitary
local governments were established, i.e. they were given the responsibilities of both tiers.
However, the law was not based on consensus – large part of parliamentary opposition refused
to participate in the drafting process because there was no political decision about full self-
government, and the heads of district administration (Gamgebeli) and mayors of unitary city
governments would still be appointed by the President.14
When Georgia joined the Council of Europe in 1999 the government took responsibility to
harmonize Georgian local government system with the European Charter on Local Self-
government within three years. Both the government and parliament agrees that there was a
need for reform. But the reform process became excessively politicised as the actors both
inside and outside of government tried to shape the reform in accordance with their private
interests. For example, the state chancellery and some ministries remained conservative as
they wished to keep central control on localities. The opposition and civic organizations tried to
weaken central bureaucracy by advocating decisive steps in the devolution of power to local
institutions.
Different groups took part in debates on local government reform, such as parliamentary
factions, non-parliamentary political parties, ministries, local government association, various
interest groups, NGOs and international aid agencies. There were two main approaches to
reform: One direction supported by opposition parliamentary factions and NGOs envisaged the
reform completing both territorial-administrative division and local government system. From this
perspective, the lower tier would be the municipal level, while the upper tier would be a bigger
territorial entity called region. Regions would be based on the traditional historical-ethnographic
division of country. The lower tier councils would be elected on the “majoritarian system”15. The
regional council would be elected by a proportional party lists system. The regional council
would elect the Governor, which would have to be approved by the President. Districts
(contemporary upper tier of local government and electoral constituencies for the parliamentary
elections) would no longer elect councils and would be kept as administrative units for efficient
management. Districts would be managed by the administration, the head of which would be
appointed by the Governor16.
Other interested parties expressed fear that this type of reform was too ambitious and hard to
complete by the next election deadline set by the organic law (autumn 2001). Followers of this
view suggested that given the time constraints it was more feasible to keep districts as upper
tier, but to meet the requirements of the European Charter by making the position of district
head of administration elected. Both views agreed, that whatever the upper tier, a clear division
of responsibilities was needed between the two tiers of local government, which was lacking in
the existing legislation. In addition, the laws on local budget, local property and revenue
redistribution should be adopted. Almost all the interested parties agreed that the system of
income redistribution among the municipalities was obsolete and unfair. They argued that in
order to decrease inequalities among the municipalities, a formula-based redistribution was
needed.
Negotiations among the interested parties resulted in amendments to the Organic Law on Local
Government and Administration, which took a middle-of-the-road position between the two
described above. Both the parliament and the government agreed that the future of the
Georgian local government was a two-tier system where the Soviet legacy of districts would be
abolished and more historical/traditional regions would be introduced. But the process of
transition to this new system would require quite a long period of research and negotiations on
14 For a historical account of local government in Georgia see: Khmaladze, Vakhtang. “Local Government in Georgia: Past,
Present and Perspectives.” UNDP-Georgia, Discussion paper series 4, 1997.
15 (Georgians call ‘majoritarian’ any system when the voter votes for the personalities rather than to party lists. This might be
elections in multimember single constituency or in single member several constituencies within a municipality).
16 The draft with these principles was prepared by the parliamentary faction of the Traditionalist party.
7how to draw the boundaries of regions. It is worth noting that neither local elites nor ethnic
minorities were ready to accept the district abolition. In addition, changes in the administrative-
territorial system would require significant amendments to the constitution, which would have
been long and complicated process. As a result it was decided to keep the two-tier system of
sub national government but to decline the importance of districts by abolishing elections on the
district level.
Structure of local government (1998-2002)
The Organic Law on Local Self-government and Administration of 1997 established two tiers of
non-central government. Both tiers have representative and executive branches, but the system
of elections of representative bodies and organisation of executive branches differ significantly
across the tiers. According to the law, the first tier is pure self-government, i.e. both the
representative and executive bodies are elected. The second tier is a combination of self-
government and central administration - elected representative body is accompanied by the
appointed head of administration. Six big cities not incorporated into the districts have
representative and executive bodies similar to the district and they have self-government
functions as well as the functions delegated from the centre.
The first tier (municipal level) operates in villages, amalgamated villages, towns and cities. In
this system, voters in each village, town and city elect councils. Elections are held on the
proportional party list system if a municipality has more than 2000 voters. If the number of
voters is less than 2000 the elections are held on the basis of multi-mandate single
constituency; each municipality is one constituency and electorate can vote for up to as many
candidates as there are seats in the council of respective municipality.
The Councils create permanent and temporary commissions to regulate different matters on the
territory of their jurisdiction and to monitor the activities of the executive branch. The Councils
have discretion over the structure and tasks of the commissions. The members of commissions
can be councillors as well as invited experts. The typical structure of commissions is:
o Revision Commission - to monitor and control revenue collection and spending by the
executive branch;
o Commission on Mandate and Procedures – to overview and regulate the membership and
internal rules of the council;
o Budgetary Commission – to analyse the revenue basis and to draft municipal budget;
o Commission on Social Issues – to deal with health and education sectors and social
protection of vulnerable population;
o Commission on Legal Issues – to regulate legality of local governments’ decisions and to
monitor protection of human rights;
o Commission on Infrastructure – to regulate and monitor water provision, street cleaning and
land use;
o Commission on Sectoral Economy – to regulate local economic activities.
The executive body of the first tier local government is a collegial body – municipal government
(Gamgeoba). The officials of the executive body are Gamgebeli (head of municipal
government), deputy Gamgebelis, heads of municipal services and chief of staff. These officials
are nominated by the Gamgebeli and approved by the council. The structure of the executive
branch, i.e. structure of departments and services is similar to that of the respective council. The
chair of first tier Council, the Gamgebeli, is also the head of municipal government. In those
settlements with population of less than 3000 the municipal government (Gamgeoba) is not
established and the executive power is concentrated within the hands of Gamgebeli.
Power relations between the executive and representative bodies as described in legislation are
to the advantage of councils. The council passes vote of no confidence of Gamgebeli if 1/3 of
8councillors initiates and majority of members support. The Council can be dismissed by the
presidential decree with the support of parliament if emergency situation is announced in
country. The Council can suspend decisions of the mayor for a month and apply to court for its
abolition. The Councils’ decisions can be abolished only by their own or court’s decision.
However, Gamgebeli can turn the decision of council back for further discussions. A typical
structure of first tier city local government is shown on figure 2.
Figure 2. Typical structure of first tier city local government (1998-2002)
The second, upper tier is district (Raion), which is a still unchanged administrative unit from the
communist rule. The districts are created on the basis of unclear data, e.g. it is not possible to
observe any criteria for the basis of district, whether of population, economic or historic.
However, because the constitution did not allow for administrative-territorial changes, the
Organic Law did not alter this division. The district elects a representative body (district council)
by proportional party lists. The chair, the secretary and the heads of different commissions are
the officials of the councils.
The executive structure of district, Gamgeoba, composed of 5-11 members, is chaired by the
head of district administration - Gamgebeli, who is appointed by the President. The President
also appoints mayors of the cities not incorporated into districts (Rustavi, Poti, Kutaisi, Batumi,
Sokhumi, Tskinvali and the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi). The president is not obliged to have
consultations before making these appointments. The exceptions are the two autonomies
(Abkhazian and Adjarian Automous Republics), where the appointment is made by the
res[ective representative body (Supreme Council of Autonomous Republic) in agreement with
the president. In the rest of the country, as a rule, candidates for the position of district
Gamgebeli are recommended by the Presidential Representatives in regions and the president
makes appointments based on that recommendations. The district council controls and
monitors the activities of the executive body. But the council can not dismiss the head of
administration; it can only apply to the president to do so, but the final decision is up to the
president.
The President can suspend the Council by recommendation of the Regional Representative if:
a) the number of Councillors decreases by more than a half; b) the first tier council can not elect
Gamgebeli within two months after elections; c) the council fails to approve the local budget
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9within two months of the start of the budget year. Yet, the decision to dismiss must be approved
by the Parliament.17
Institutional changes of 2002
As mentioned above, the possible directions of the local government reform has long been
debated. Consensus was reached by August 2001 when the organic law had been significantly
amended. The amendments left intact the two-tier system of sub national government. But there
were significant institutional changes.
The first change refers to the system of election. Councils in all first ties are elected in
multimember single constituencies. Voters have as many votes as there are seats in the
respective council. The candidates with the highest number of votes are elected as councillors.
Cities, towns and villages with more than 5000 voters directly elect Gamgebelis/Mayors,
including big cities not incorporated into districts. There are only two exceptions: capital Tbilisi
and Poti, where the president still appoints mayors. Candidates for the position of mayor or
councillor can be nominated either by political parties or by initiative groups. Certain decline of
the importance of political parties can be observed as 51% of elected Gamgebelis/Mayors were
nominated by the initiative groups and thus formally not affiliated with any party.18 Typical
structure of first tier city local government is described on figure 3.
Figure 3. Typical structure of first tier city local government since 2002
The institutional change created solid preconditions for building new relations between the
representative and executive branches based on the principles of classical division of power. To
compare the changes in the formal power relations with other transitional countries one can
17 For further description of local government system see: Losaberidze, David, Kandelaki, Konstantine, and Orvelashvili, Niko.
“Local Government in Georgia.” in Igor Munteanu, Igor and Popa, Victor (eds.) Developing New Rules in the Old Environment.
Budapest: OSI/LGI, 2001.
18 Central Election Commission of Georgia - http://www.cec.gov.ge/Cfdocs/sabolooshedegebi.cfm
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observe the shift from the ‘strong council’ of Estonian type to the ‘strong mayor’ of Bulgarian
type.19
On the second, district tier directly elected council is abolished and so called ‘associational
council’ is introduced. In this system chairs of municipal councils within the district compose the
district council. The president of Georgia appoints the district head of administration
(Gamgebeli) from among the district councillors, i.e. from among the chairs of the municipal
councils within the district.
The second important change is about the incentives for amalgamation. There are over 1000
first tier local governments in Georgia. The majority of them are very small, with extremely
scarce resources. To address this problem amendment encourages amalgamation of
municipalities by allocating additional subsidies for local governments, which decide to
amalgamate. Municipalities can also create joint organs to carry out some common functions.
The amendments significantly changed the degree of financial autonomy of local governments.
After the reform local governments will have considerably greater financial autonomy as they
will receive transfers based on the equalization formula. Local authorities are free to decide how
to spend these funds. But the transfer for the delegated competences must be spent as the
centre decides.
To conclude, the new system gives more power and autonomy to local governments. It divides
functions and duties between the representative and executive bodies more clearly. It also
changes formal power relations to the advantage of the elected mayor. Now the question is
whether these formal changes will be reflected in decision-making practices.
Table 3. Changes in formal power relations in local government, 2002.
LG old system LG new system
Mayor Council Mayor Council
Elections Indirect Direct Direct Direct
Appointments
City government Appoints Approves Appoints Approves
Chief of staff Appoints Approves Appoints Approves
Committees Coordinates Elects - Elects
Formal roles
Head of executive Chair/Mayor Yes -
Represents LG Chair/Mayor Yes -
Chairs council Chair/Mayor - Chair
Right to dismiss - Yes - No
Budget Submits Approves Submits Approves
Division of competences
The organic law does not set up classifications of lower tier municipalities and gives the same
power and competences to all municipalities regardless of their size. But between the two tiers,
competences are divided. However, before the reform the exact interpretation of this division
was always debated. One view, often expressed by councillors, says that the organic law gives
insufficient attention to the division of duties and responsibilities. Indeed, there are articles that
give the same duties to both tiers. However, one might argue that this duplication derives from
the subsidiarity principle; e.g. the first tier can deal with the issue if finances and expertise allow
for it. If they can not cope with a competence, then the upper tier will complement to lower tier’s
services. This approach implies at least two assumptions: First, that the organic law is followed
by the series of laws regulating property, revenue and redistribution matters and second, that
19 Price, T. “Power Relations in Local Governments in Central and Eastern Europe.”
(http://t-rc.org/TocquevillePapers/Power/Paper.html)
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the councils of different tiers have both willingness and skills to negotiate and cooperate with
the government as well as with each other. In the Georgian context neither of these two
assumptions works. As a result having neither pressure from below nor strict division of
responsibilities and functions, the upper tier secures the whole power. The real picture of the
two tier relations can be observed looking at the budgetary process. Although legally all budgets
must be independent, in practice the district decides on behalf of the lower tier as regards its
revenue.
The number of lower tier municipalities exceeds 1000 and the majority of them are too small to
cope with their legally assigned competences. There are several sources of revenue for the
local government: shares in national government taxes, local taxes and fees and central
matching transfers, which must be spent as the central government decides. The Parliament
annually assigns a fixed percentage of certain taxes to local government units. As for the
transfers, the Ministry of Finances on the basis of negotiation process allocates them. However,
the current budget law does not take into consideration first tier local government units.
Government transfer is delivered to the district and the first tier budgets are funded by the
district authorities. The quantity given to the lower tier depends on face-to-face relations, rather
than on the formula based calculations, that would redistribute revenues and thus eliminate
inequalities.
The other view, followed by the centre and upper tier authorities suggest that the reason of
decreasing capacity of the lower tier lies in their insufficient professionalism. They are believed
to lack the experience and education necessary to enforce legally assigned duties. The reasons
might be several: firstly, due to the Soviet tradition, district centres used to attract better
expertise than rural areas. Secondly, these processes have continued in the transitional period
when there was a big migration of professionals from the villages. In addition, as many
councillors argue, the proportional party list system of voting gave a chance to unskilled and
inexperienced people to get into the councils. Therefore, most of the local officials think that at
the local level only majoritarian elections are relevant when people vote for the personalities
and not for the abstract promises of the parties.
The amendments to the organic law in 2001 significantly changed division of competences
between the two tiers. Generally, the first tier local governments are granted compulsory and
voluntary competences. Compulsory competences are divided into the two groups: exclusive
and delegated. Local governments can enjoy complete freedom in exercising their exclusive
competences.
Competences such as current and capital expenditures of education, health care and culture
organisations, social protection of the vulnerable, protection of cultural heritage, management of
state property on the territory and public safety are delegated to the district authorities; but a
municipality can negotiate with the district authorities to further delegate a competence if its
resources allows for that. This transfer may be possible with mutual agreement and may be
supported by contract. But if a municipal government fails to undertake delegated responsibility
district administration becomes responsible for delivery of respective services. Division of
competences between the tiers in summarised in the table 4 below.
Recent institutional change created number of opportunities for local governments to meet the
requirements of the citizens and for the population to receive quality services from their elected
officials. Firstly, competences are divided clearly between the tiers and there is little room left for
overlapping. Secondly, separate sources of legitimacy of executive and representative bodies
create solid preconditions for checks and balances between the two branches of local
government. Thirdly, coulcillors are elected individually and they carry personal responsibilities
to the voters. Fourthly, local governments can amalgamate or create joint structures for
common services that will lead to improved service delivery to the public.
However, the new system has several limitations: First, the laws on income redistribution, local
budget and transfer of property are not still adopted. Second, the district administration holds
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very important part of the competences and is not always willing to delegate these competences
to the municipalities. Third, coulcillors are elected in multimember single constituency, i.e. each
council represents the whole municipality and not a particular ward.
Table 4. Classification of local government’s competences
Classification by typeFunctional classification
Exclusive Delegated
Administrative competence: Right
of creation, restructuring or abolishing
of local public organizations.
Service competence: Right to
assess local needs and plan service
delivery to respond these needs.
Investment competence: Right of
mobilization and investment of
financial/ human resources to achieve
certain objectives.
Regulative competence: Right to
introduce compulsory rules,
regulations, licenses, and fines on
their territories.
o Adoption of regulations and statutes of local
public institutions
o Managing local property
o Local budgeting and local taxation
o Local development planning
o Managing municipal services and enterprises
o Maintenance of local archives
o Housing management
o Dissemination of public information
o Municipal transport management
o Maintenance of local roads
o Urban development and design
o Municipal programs on social protection,
healthcare and culture
o Water supply
o Electricity and gas supply
o Local parks
o Civil registration
o Environment protection
and sanitation
o Management of public
property
o Procurement support for
the military
Source: based on the amendments to the Organic Law on Local Government and Administration, August 2001.
 
3. MEASURING INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE
General constraints for institutions
This part aims to evaluate and compare institutional performance of pilot municipalities before
and after the local government reform. Analysis is based on the interviews with stakeholders
and review of the official documents of the municipal bodies. The stakeholders can be divided
into the two groups – internal customers and external customers. Internal customers are elected
and appointed local officials and external customers – institutions and organisations that are
recipients of local government’s services.
These two groups of stakeholders were asked to evaluate the performance of local
governments before and after the reform. Two competing approaches can be identified: for the
internal customers the organic law has many shortcomings, which create fiscal, administrative,
and property problems for local governments. The second approach advocated mainly by the
external customers focus more on the capacity and participation problems. Both approaches will
be discussed below separately.
Before the adoption of the Organic Law on Local Government and administration (1997)
Georgian parliament had largely completed reforming of national legislation. When the organic
law came to the scene, it became necessary to harmonize the legislation to newly emerged
institutional settings. Despite the fact that the organic law clearly stated that government and
parliament had to amend necessary laws and adopt new ones to strengthen emerging local
government, the process never started. The parliament did not adopt laws such as the Law on
Local Budgets, the Law on Central Transfers, the Law on Local Property. The organic law
defines local property as “property which according to Georgian legislation is possessed, used,
and managed by local government bodies.” A transfer of ownership of state property to local
governments occurred in the early 1990s. At that time, properties that were under the
jurisdiction of state ministries were considered state-owned, and those that were under the
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jurisdiction of the local soviets (councils) were transferred to the district administrations. District
administrations still remain the lowest parts of the central government hierarchical structure.
Therefore it is impossible to differentiate state and local ownership.
First tier local governments continue to request more property, which is necessary for
implementation of their exclusive competences. For example, local government is responsible
for the public utility services, while the property that is necessary to carry out the services is still
state owned. A Presidential Decree of 1999 established a process of allocating state property to
local governments, but the decree deals with property on an individualized basis rather than as
a category subject to automatic transfer. The decree requires that district administrations submit
a proposal to the Ministry of State Property Management, which must include a business and
investment plan. The district administration may decide to further transfer the property to the
municipalities incorporated into the district. Because this process is complicated, only very few
properties have been transferred to the local governments.
According to the Tax Code, an enterprise must pay taxes to the budget of the territorial unit
where they are registered officially. As the biggest and profitable companies are mostly
registered in the capital, although frequently based in the regions, local governments lose this
source of revenue. These legislative shortcomings are accompanied by the general economic
decline and massive tax evasion. Local governments can not administer taxes on their own.
The taxes whether introduced by local councils or allocated to local governments by the
parliament are all collected by the district offices of the national tax collection service. The tax
offices are accountable to the Ministry of Finances and their main objective is to meet targets
set for the national budget. Local governments have no power to monitor the activities of tax
offices. There were some attempts to amend legislation and set up separate local tax
inspections to improve tax administration for local budgets. But the government does not make
this decision because of easily predictable overlaps between the national and local tax services
from what private sector may suffer.
The government failed to complete comprehensive legislation on local government. When
analysing its weak institutional performance, this should not be neglected. But one can argue
that even in the existing, non-perfect legal framework there was some possibility for local
development. This development could have been possible on the basis of local initiative, but
these initiatives were absent. This lack of initiatives perhaps gives a better explanation of
institutional underdevelopment. The councillors often complained that there was no consistency
between their revenue and competencies, but normally they did not try either to organise their
interests or to unite efforts. In the target municipalities it is hard to see any examples of
successful cooperation in solving problems with a bigger catchment area than a single
municipality.
A good indicator of poor organization of interests is the failure of local governments’
associations in 1998-2002. Two associations were created in 1999. The Councils Association of
Georgia was considered as centre oriented as the central government actively participated in its
set up. The association developed top-down approach going from the national office to regional
associations down to districts, but it did not reach the municipal level. The Association of City
Councils was oriented to grassroots, trying to unite municipalities where the opposition parties
were dominant. Neither of the associations was able to articulate general problems of local
governments and lobby for their solutions at the centre. Lacking financial and moral support
from the councils both associations stopped functioning after the elections of 2002.
The last obstacle for quality institutional performance is lack of communications between the
local officials and the public. It is worth noting that both citizens and elected officials had bigger
expectation from local governments than it was able to do in reality. Many councillors seemed to
believe that they would have executive power. Citizens expected improved quality of services
delivered by the elected bodies. In reality, councillors discovered that they had hardly anything
to decide and people did not feel any improvement in service provisions. As a result some
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councillors lost interest in their representative duties and councils became governed by small
elites normally composed by the chair, secretary and two or three chairs of key commissions.
Having no pressure from the disillusioned citizens, the elite ruled the municipality according to
their private interests and not according to the local needs.
A model for measurement
General obstacles for the institutional performance lead to measure it in relative terms, i.e.
observe affects of recent formal institutional change on the level of performance. For the
evaluation strict and reliable indicators are needed. One of the most well designed evaluation
model with carefully chosen indicators can be found in Putnam’s influential work on Italian
regional government.20 His approach has been successfully used by Stoner-Weiss in the
transitional context of Russian regional governments.21 Both scholars use a combination of
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ criteria; the ‘objective’ criteria are formally pre-designed by the
researcher to evaluate as many areas of government’s activity as possible. The ‘subjective’
indicators show customer satisfaction, i.e. measures evaluation of local government given by
the people who are the recipients of its services.
Another interesting approach is developed by Gabor Soos. The objective of his model is to
measure local governments’ performance across countries in comparative perspective. To
achieve the objective, he develops an idealized model of local government based on the
general duties a good local government must fulfil: (1) make informed and coordinated
decisions; (2) be open and fair (democratic); (3) effectively implement decisions; (4) display
responsiveness to local citizens. These four duties are considered as dependent variables that
may be affected by a number of explanatory variables such as the level of devolution, power
relations, political culture, etc. Each dependent variable has several indicators. Data for
measurement can be obtained either through the analysis of official documents or responses to
survey questionnaires.22
The approach used in this paper is largely adopted from Putnam, Stoner-Weiss and Soos. But
the objective of this paper is different from that of the mentioned authors. For example, Putnam
and Stoner-Weiss wished to explain why some regional governments were more successful in
governance than others. Soos aimed at the design of measures that could be comparable
across countries. In contrast, the objective of this paper is to understand why the local
institutions were performing in the way they were performing. Therefore, my focus will be more
on description and less on evaluation.
The other difference concerns the responsiveness criteria. Putnam and Stoner-Weiss both had
opportunity to examine the levels of customer satisfaction through time based on quantitative
survey results. Georgia lacks this opportunity. In addition, recent surveys show that population
is poorly informed about the local governments functions and responsibilities and the results of
quantitative survey might be misleading. For example, a quantitative survey of 2002 has
indicates that 77% of the respondents in the regions where the pilot municipalities are situated
are not aware of their elected local governments’ activities.23 Therefore, the measures for the
responsiveness category are taken from the interviews with the stakeholders.
To describe the institutional performance of the pilot municipalities I will use four main
categories, several components for each category and indicators for each component. The main
categories are: process, output, implementation and responsiveness. These categories grasp a
range of local governments’ activities such as policy-making, revenue planning, service delivery,
20 Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
21 Stoner-Weiss, K. (1996). Local Heroes. The Political Economy of Russian Regional Government. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
22 Soos, G. (2001). The Indicators of Local Democratic Governance Project. Concepts and Hypotheses. Budapest: LGI/OSI.
23 Quantitative research conducted by GORBI (2002). Unpublished.
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relations to constituencies, etc. But as the research mainly addresses the question of
participation and inclusiveness in divided communities the focus is on the responsiveness
category. Soos fairly mentions that responsiveness category is different from democratic
performance category as not all responsive activities are democratic.24 From this perspective
components describing democratic performance – coordination and inclusiveness - are
incorporated in process and responsiveness categories. Table 5 below summarizes the model
of measurement.
Table 5. Model for measurement local governments’ institutional performance
Category Component Indicator
Bargaining Receiving more competencesPolicy process
Coordination Involvement of internal customers
Administrative competence Stability of LG structuresPolicy output
Regulative competence Stability of regulations
Own revenue planning Collection of local feesPolicy Implementation
Expenditure planning Balance of budget
Service competence Adapting services to wants and needsResponsiveness
Inclusiveness Involving of community groups
Policy process category aims to describe local governments’ performance in policy-making.
Components of this category derive from two expectations regarding the policy-making process:
(1) local governments are expected to manage their jurisdictions within their competences freely
and independently; (2) local governments are expected to make coordinated decisions where
both representative and executive bodies are equally involved. in Georgian realities local
governments act in competition with district administrations over the competences. Hence, the
indicator for independent policy making is the result of bargaining with the district authorities
over competences. For the second, coordination component the indicator is the level of
coordination between the executive and representative branches in the process of decision-
making.
Policy output category addresses local governments’ ability to implement administrative and
regulative competences, i.e. ability to make coherent regulations for the public spheres in their
jurisdictions and create relevant administrative structures to manage municipal affairs. The
indicators for administrative and regulative components are respectively setting up stable
organizational structures and adoption of coherent regulations for local customers.
Policy implementation category refers to local government’s capacity to pursue self-declared
goals. The components of this category must cover local governments’ those activities that fall
into the exclusive competences of local governments. There are two components: one more
general refers to local governments capacity to plan and implement municipal budget. The
indicator of the category is annual balance of the budget. Second, more specific components is
about planning local government’s own revenue. The indicator for the component is the level of
collection of local fees. The rationales of the indicator are the following: First, local governments
have full discretion in introducing local fees and defining its rate up to the ceiling established by
the Law on Local Fees. Therefore, local governments, based on the realistic forecasts, can plan
independently this source of revenue. Second, local governments are responsible for collection
of local fees unlike tax revenues, which are collected by the local branches of the national Tax
Inspection. Third, local fees are frequently collected from those businesses that are owned by
influential personalities. Examples of such businesses are marketplaces and parking places.
Therefore, good level of local fee collection clearly indicates local governments’ ability of policy
implementation as it covers components such as planning, administration and coping with
interest groups.
24 Soos, G. (2001). The Indicators of Local Democratic Governance Project. Concepts and Hypotheses. Budapest: LGI/OSI. 18.
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Responsiveness category covers two components: service competence and inclusiveness. The
first refers to local government’s ability to adapt and deliver services according to local needs.
The second component deals with the level inclusion of different groups of community in local
governance processes. Service competence category is more about the managerial capacity of
local government to respond citizens’ wants and needs. While inclusiveness category deals with
the fundamental duty of local governments to let citizens’ groups participate in decision-making.
Thus the category examines local governments’ ability to implement this fundamental duty.
Performance profiles of municipalities
This part describes performance of the three pilot municipalities based on the qualitative
interviews with local government, non-governmental sector, business, media, health and
education representatives. The research indicated that each of the tree municipalities was
involved in the process of bargaining with the district administrations over management of
education sector. According to the legislation, a competence can not be given to local
government without necessary financial resources. Thus, the bargaining over education
management was at the same time bargaining over additional resources for local governments.
These additional resources could come either from greater shares of national taxes allocated to
the city local governments and/or from so called ‘internal transfer’, i.e. transfer from the district
budget to municipal one. The pilot municipalities differ significantly in the outcomes of
bargaining. The difference was largely determined by the ability of city leadership to persuade
district administrations by demonstrating their power. There are three patterns of the outcomes
of bargaining: Gori is one extreme, where the city authorities had very tense relations with the
district administration. Although by the legislation education management was a competence of
the first tier local government before 2002, the municipality could never received it. However,
the city failed to appeal to the judiciary system where they must have won the case. It is worth
noting that there was no formal appeal of city government. The leaders tried to solve the issue
by means of face-to-face relations. The situation did not change with the removal of the city
mayor who represented a right wing opposition party. The newly elected mayor was from the
ruling party, nevertheless competence was held within the district level. After the elections of
2002 both the representative and executive bodies of city local government were completely
changed. According to new amendments, education management was delegated to the district
but the city government could apply for it. The new city government decided not to apply and
the competence is implemented by the district administration.
A very different case was observed in Khashuri, where the city local government managed the
education sector since 1998 without no obstacles from the district administration. This
happened despite the fact that an opposition left wing party governed the city. The city
government proved that it could finance education sector with its own resources. The local
elections of 2002 resulted in the re-election of half of the city councilors but a new person was
elected as a mayor. The council continued to display good working relations with the district
administration while the city government did not. As a result, the city local government was
refused to keep education sector under its management from 2003.
The third case is Akhaltsikhe, where competence was given to the municipality in 1998 but was
taken back in 2000 by the district administration. Generally, the city government of Akhaltsikhe
was largely dominated by the district administration. As a result the city government failed to
oppose this change. The elections of 2002 completely changed the composition of both city
council and city government. The new government decided that the management of education
was a too big burden and did not apply for this competence.
On the second, coordination component, the municipalities also differ. In 1998-2002
coordination was at a high level in Khashuri, while in Gori and Akhaltsikhe city mayors were
largely dominating and frequently even ignoring councils. This resulted in the removal of the
mayor in Gori in 2000, but a new mayor continued the authoritarian-style government without
much coordination with the representative body. After the elections of 2002 situation reversed:
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high coordination between the executive and representative bodies can be observed in Gori and
Akhaltsikhe, but in Khashuri the coordination level decreased.
In the policy output component the pilot municipalities are not very different from each other.
They all used fully their administrative and regulative competences. Local governments created
departments and services to regulate different spheres of public life at the localities, introduced
regulations on local taxes and fees. But neither administrative, nor regulative decisions were
stable. Local governments frequently were changing regulations. The explanation was to meet
local needs better, but one can argue, that decision were not prepared well in the first place.
After elections, the administrative structure of city local governments also changed. But this was
a result of the overall change in local government structure rather than lack of comprehensive
design. It is important to note that there is sufficient improvement in administrative and
regulative competences in all municipalities after the elections of 2002. Each of the local
governments restructured councils and governments, established new services such as PR
service in Gori or Marketplace Ltd. in Akhaltsikhe with 100% local government share.
As annex 2 indicates, only Khashuri local government managed to plan expenditure and collect
local fees reasonably. According to expert’s evaluation, planning was realistic, administration
was on high level and a trend of increased total and own revenue could be observed. Policy
implementation component was at extremely low level in Gori in 1999 but later the process
relatively improved. But as experts evaluate, local revenue basis was considerably bigger than it
had been planned. Akhaltsikhe local government also displayed inability to implement their
decisions on collection of local fees. There is one important trend in all municipalities: level of
local fee collection improved after the elections of 2002.
A general, subjective indicator of local governments’ responsiveness may be local elections of
2002. Former councillors have been re-elected only in Khashuri. The former mayor also ran for
the position of councillor as this position would give him an opportunity to be appointed as a
head of district administration, which actually happened. In Akhaltsikhe the former mayor took
only fourth place in elections. In addition, none of the city councillors were re-elected. In Gori
the first mayor did not participate in elections. The second mayor lost elections and none of his
fellows from the former council was re-elected.
The stakeholders’ views of the local government performance are generally in accord with the
election results. In Gori it was mentioned that local government could not be responsive as they
broke all ties to their electorate right after the elections. If the local government had a better
information flow with population, they would receive adequate support the electorate in struggle
with the district authorities. In Khashuri local government responsiveness is not evaluated
negatively. The stakeholders believe that local authorities were not involved in corruption and
both the mayor and the council met people’s expectations as much as they could under the
existing legal and economic circumstances. Extremely weak responsiveness is displayed by the
Akhaltsikhe city government, which completely failed to provide population with clean drinking
water. Even more, when water was polluted, the local government did not worn population and
did not stop water supply because of the fear of public disorder.
The level of involvement of community groups was very low in all municipalities. Neither ethnic,
not political groups were involved in the process of decision-making. City officials took
individualistic approach: they did not recognize organized interests and treated citizens
individually. Newly elected local governments improved service delivery component but failed to
make steps towers greater involvement of different community groups.
Table 6 schematically compares local governments’ performances under the old and new
systems. It is important to note that institutional change of 2002 made significant impact on local
governments’ performances in categories such as intergovernmental relations, implementation
of decisions and competences. But the category of inclusiveness stayed the same – newly
elected local governments failed to involve community groups as much as their predecessors
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did. The next part of the paper tries to explain these changes by the structure of policy
networks.
Table 6. Comparison of institutional performance of pilot municipalities
Municipalities Policy process Policy output Implementation Responsiveness
1998-
2002
2002-
Present
1998-
2002
2002-
Present
1998-
2002
2002-
Present
1998-
2002
2002-
Present
Gori Low Medium Medium High Low Medium Low Low
Khashuri High Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Low
Akhaltsikhe Low Medium Medium Medium Low Medium Low Low
4. POLICY NETWORKS AND DECISION-MAKING
Description of reputational networks
This part of the paper analyses policy networks in the local policy domains and offers network
explanation of institutional performance in pilot municipalities. The importance of networks in the
transitional countries is well documented: based on the Hungarian case study some prominent
students of social networks argue that the importance of networks was more important in
communist countries than in developed post-industrial states. Even more, during the transition
from the planned to the market economy people started rely on networks even more
extensively.25 This description fully applies to the Georgian society. Georgia has long been
considered as a society where interpersonal informal networks governed important and
profitable sector such as shadow economy.26
The meaning and application of the concept of ‘policy networks’ is highly debated in the
literature. The British authors (Marsh and Rhodes) argue that policy networks are models of
group representation and interest mediation27. The Dutch and German schools believe that
policy networks are new form of governance.28 This paper understands the policy networks as
a tool for interest mediation between the public institutions and private interest groups.
Actors in local policy domains can be divided into the two broad categories. The first category
is institutional actors, i.e. actors that act for or in behalf on the institutions. The second category
is individual actors that are difficult to affiliate with any institution or organization. Both
categories can be further divided into local and national actors. Local actors rarely expend their
influence beyond their formally defined jurisdictions, while national actors have much bigger
influence on different policy domains both in territorial and sectoral dimensions. As it is
described in table 1 each actor has defined policy interests. To achieve these interests certain
power relations with other actors are built and collective actions are pursued.
What methods can be used to find important actors and their networks in local policy domains?
There are several strategies in collection of network data. One approach seeks to find important
players in decision-making. To achieve this, formal contested decisions are analyzed and
25 Sik, Endre, Wellman, Barry. ‘Network Capital in Capitalist, Communist and Postcommunist Countries.” in Wellman, Barry (ed.)
Networks in the Global Village. Life in Contemporary Communities. Westview Press, 1999.
26 Mars, Gerald and Altman, Yochanan. “Case Studies in Second Economy Production and Transportation in Soviet Georgia.”
and “Case Studies in Second Economy Distribution in Soviet Georgia.” in Alessandrini, Sergio and Dallago, Bruno. (eds.) The
Unofficial Economy. Consequences and Perspectives in Different Economic Systems. Gower Publishing Company, 1987.
27 Marsh, D. (1998). The Development of the Policy Network Approach. In Marsh, D. (Ed.). Comparing Policy Networks.
Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press.
28 Kickert, W.J.M., Kliyn, E., Koopenjan, J.F.M. (1997). Managing Complex networks. Strategies for the Public Sector. London:
Sage publications.
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participants of the decision-making process are traced back. The second approach studies
actors’ leadership positions in the key organizations and assumes that these actors have
significant influence on policy-making. The third approach used in this paper studies actors’
reputation in their communities.29
Each approach has both advantages and disadvantages. Decision-based analysis may ignore
some significant actors who formally did not participate in decision-making but nevertheless
achieved their objectives. In addition, this approach pays little attention to non-decisions, i.e.
some actors may intervene and because of this intervention the decision will not come on
agenda at all. Positional and repurtational approaches may overlook actors that do not occupy
important positions or are not well known in the communities but have enough resources to
achieve their objectives.
The research originally intended to track policy networks based on the decisions by local
government bodies. This type of data collection is appropriate when the contested decisions
can be identified.30 But closer examination of the official decisions of local governments
indicated that within the competences of local governments there are very few issues, which
would attract interests from the variety of groups. In addition, many actors like top officials of
central and regional governments may be excluded from analysis, which will seriously distort
the picture of reality. Therefore, a combination of positional and reputaional analysis of networks
has been decided. On the first staged actors were chosen according to their leadership
positions in the key organizations. On the second stage these actors were asked to name other
actors who were regarded as powerful and influential in the communities. This approach implies
that identified actors either have influence on local governments now, or will have it in the future
if local governments make significant decisions. It is worth noting that reputation is not attribute
of actors themselves but are group judgments made about them by others. Therefore,
reputational research only partially reflects realities and the results can be distorted by social
construction of group judgments.31
As briefly described above, on the first stage focal actors were selected and listed according to
their leadership positions from organizations active in local policy domains. These actors were
asked to nominate the most influential actors from the list and add additional actors if they
thought anyone was missing. On the second stage the snowball method has been used: This
method begins with the focal actors, and continues until no new actors are identified or until the
researcher decides to stop.32
The three pilot municipalities differ in the structure of policy networks. But they have two
common characteristics. First, networks are hierarchically organized, i.e. there are cliques of
high importance (reputation) and cliques subordinated to them. In all cases dominant clique is
composed of the appointed high officials on the regional and district levels. Cliques, where local
governments are the main actors are in all cases subordinated and dependent on the dominant
cliques. Second, all of the identified cliques whether dominant or subordinated, involve one or
more actors from the national politics, normally from the capital. These actors are either
members of parliament, or leaders of national parties, or high bureaucrats in the government.
Before the elections of 2002 in all municipalities policy network was composed of two -
bureaucratic and local government cliques. The centralized bureaucratic clique normally
consisted of the presidential representative in the region, his deputies, who are frequently
29 Melbeck, C. (1998) Comparing Local Policy Networks. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 10(4). 
30 For example, Rober Dahl studied power structure in New Haven based on the contested issues such as school rebuilding, city
planning, etc. See: Dahl, R. (1961). Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University
Presss.
31 Knoke, D. (1998) Who Steals My Purse Stills Trash. The Structure of Organizational Influence Reputation. Journal of
Theoretical Politics. 10(4). 509.
32 Wasserman, S., and Faust K. (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
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wealthy businessmen, the head of district administration, deputy head of administration in
financial matters, member of parliament elected from the respective district, businessmen,
frequently of debatable reputation, heads of local branches of ministries such as Ministry of
Internal Affairs, local branch of Prosecutor General’s Office. The actors were connected with
exclusively strong ties, i.e. they displayed trust to each other, depended on each other on
resources and frequently were close friends. It is very common that these actors tried to turn
their friendship/business relations in next of kin relations - baptized each other’s children.
In the local governance cliques normally the following actors were included: mayor, chair of
council, influential councillots from the city and district (normally chairs of commissions), leaders
of political parties, businessmen. The cliques was also composed of strong ties - actors heavily
depended on each other for information and resources.
There are three patterns of relations between the bureaucratic and local government cliques
before the elections of 2002. The first patters – domination of bureaucracy clique over local
government one (Akhaltsikhe). Second pattern, no ties between the two cliques (Gori) and third,
merging of the local government cliques into the bureaucratic clique. (Khashuri). It is interesting
that Khashuri is the only place where the city mayor had been acting as a bridge between the
bureaucratic and local government cliques, which led to his appointment as a head of district
administration.
The elections of 2002 did not change general structure of networks in Gori and Akhaltsike
although in both municipalities executive and representative bodies were completed by newly
elected and appointed persons. In Khashuri where the rate of re-election was higher, the
structure of networks changed considerably: one part of former local government clique merged
into the bureaucratic clique. In addition, new clientelistic clique emerged which was led by a
wealthy businessman and Member of Parliament.33 The members of this network were clients of
the businessman – his relatives and friends who financially depended on him. The clique was
successful in local elections and managed to occupy key positions in the mayor’s office. To sum
up, the relatively autonomous local government clique disappeared and the policy network
became split between the two cliques with strong connections with the central government.
Civil society: the loss of innocence
Local policy networks could not be fully described without the analysis of civil society groups.
Local elections of 2002 could be considered as breaking point regarding the role of non-
governmental organizations in decision-making. It is important to note that before the elections
no NGO leader was mentioned as influential in local decision-making process while after the
elections certain increase in their reputation could be observed.
Gibson offers an interesting approach to civil society analysis. He claims that civil society
groups are catalysts for generating new ideas and thus contributing to the development of
democracy. The contribution is significant if two conditions are in place: (1) civil society groups
are composed of weak ties that crosscut relatively heterogeneous groups; (2) networks are
politically relevant, i.e. network member are engaged in political discussions. 34
Civil society groups were engaged in political discussions since their formation in Georgia.
During the term of the first elected local government in Georgia (1998-2002) quite a few local
NGOs were created to help the newly elected local institutions to function properly. In the pilot
municipalities many NGOs started working in fields of local government transparency and
33 Clientelistic relations are very developed in Georgian public and private life. an interesting account of the roots and outcomes
of cleinelism in Georgia can be found at: Kikabidze, K., and Losaberidze, D. (2000) Institutionalism and Clientelism in Georgia.
UNDP-Georgia, Discussion Paper Series 3.
34 Gibson, J.L. (1998) Social Networks and Civil Society in Process of democratization. Studies in Public Policy 301. Centre for
Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 6.
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citizens’ advocacy. Funds for these organizations were coming exclusively from international
donors. The idea was to empower local citizens through financing transparency and advocacy
oriented activities of NGOs. The main preconditions for NGO to get funding always was to
maintain non-partisan orientation.
This created a situation when non-governmental sector was better funded and supported than
local government structures, which pushed some local government officials to found NGOs and
thus access foreign funds. In some cases the ‘governmental NGOs’ were able to secure funds
from the donors using a ‘synergy approach’, implementing projects in partnership with local
governments. Examples of such organizations could be found in all of the pilot municipalities.
Very often these NGOs were channelling funds for services, which local governments had to
provide according to legislation.
Along with the ‘governmental NGOs’ there were other organizations with non-partisan
reputation that implemented successful projects in fields such as monitoring of local
expenditures, analysing local government decisions, fighting corruption in local governments,
etc. These NGOs managed to gather significant material, technical and human resources for
several years.
NGOs whether governmental or non-partisan, were very weakly institutionalised. They have
very limited number of members, who are normally founders. Boards exist on the paper to meet
the requirements of legislation and impress donors. In practice founders make both policy and
administrative decisions. The top management of NGOs are very often family members or lose
friends. Going back to Gibson’s analysis, NGOs may be treated as close organizations with
dense strong ties among the members. As the institution of NGOs was initiated from external
players – international donor organizations – they found very difficult to maintain weak ties
across the heterogeneous groups of their c communities.
Local elections of 2002 created an excellent opportunity to observe the process of alliance
building and power redistribution in the pilot municipalities. Very important changes have
occurred in the structures of local networks as during the elections new players have emerged
on the political scene - civil society groups. In all of the pilot cities NGOs were strongly
supporting their favourite candidates and in some cases played crucial role in helping the
candidates to win.
In both Akhaltsikhe and Gori the strongest NGOs were actively campaigning for the candidates
who subsequently won the elections and became Mayors. It is worth noting that all of them were
ranked highest on their activities, technical resources and expertise as well as on the degree of
non-partisan orientation before the elections (in 2001).35 In both cases NGOs created coalitions
with business groups: In Akhaltsikhe with the media group that owns local TV station, and in
Gori with the business group that was actively involved in property re-distribution during the
privatisation.
The Khashuri case is more complicated. Non-governmental sector, as well as the whole policy
network, was split between the two powerful cliques. Ties of NGOs with the dominant cliques
became that strong that after the elections non-governmental leaders became high officials in
city local government.
What can be the consequences of increased NGO involvement in the local governments? The
NGO leaders involved in the elections processes argue that their involvement was a result of
increased disillusionment by the previous local governments’ activities. They believe that their
involvement and subsequent closer cooperation with local authorities will improve local
governments’ openness, transparency and responsiveness. However, the organizations that
chose to remain non-partisan, express a fear that local authorities will be open and transparent
35 Regional Research Report. NGO Sector and Civil Society. UN Association of Georgia, The Eurasia Foundation, Tbilisi, 2002.
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to their ally NGOs only. In addition the civil society sector might lose the ability to monitor the
local governments’ activities properly and to criticize it when necessary. Even more, this
cooperation might become a precondition of monopolizing all the foreign assistance by the
strong local government-NGO-business alliances.
As it was described above, local elections resulted in changes in policy networks; in one case
the change was structural, i.e. instead of centralized bureaucratic and relatively autonomous
local government cliques two centralized cliques emerged and local government became split
between them. In remaining two cases structure of networks did not change, but there were
significant changes in local government cliques. The paper argues that changes in policy
network are effects of formal institutional change, namely the introduction of directly elected
mayors. Direct elections gave more political legitimacy to mayors, which enabled them to build
coalitions and compete with the bureaucratic cliques. Thirty years ago Robert Dahl noted that
the position of elected officials was key in building coalitions:
…The top leaders are most likely to compose a coalition of public officials and private individuals who reflect the
interests concerns of different segments of the community. In this view, a coalition is generally formed and the
policies of coalition are coordinated by elected leaders who draw on special skills, and resources of influence that
leaders without public office are not likely to have.36
Indeed, after the elections directly elected mayors managed to create strong alliances with the
non-governmental groups and private actors. The strength of these alliance enabled local
government cliques to turn strong ties with the dominant bureaucratic cliques into weak ties.
This facilitated information exchange and coordination between the cliques and thus local
government’s performance improved. These processes could be observed in Gori and
Akhaltsikhe. The case of Khashuri is different: local elections resulted in equal split of local
policy domain between the bureaucratic and clientelistic cliques. These cliques maintain
‘competing’ rather than ‘cooperation’ ties and this may explain certain decline in the city
government’s institutional performance.
Thus the structure of policy networks is crucial for understanding why a municipality performs
one way or the other. The results of the research show that local government performs better if
cliques of policy network are connected through weak ties. The latest institutional change
clearly increased the mayors’ ability to act as bridges between the bureaucratic local
government cliques. This resulted in better coordination and information exchange between the
until then closed cliques. But if a policy domain is split between the equally powerful cliques and
there are not weak ties between them, exchange and coordination does not take place and the
level of performance decreases.
In spite of important changes in the composition of policy networks and policy outcomes, the
situation did not change regarding inclusiveness; ethnic and political groups still play marginal
roles in managing local affairs. The next part discusses the options of participatory governance
given the structure of policy networks.
5. MODELS OF PARTICIPATION
The analysis indicates that despite the presence of devolved local governments in Georgia,
appointed bureaucrats still maintain overwhelming control on the localities. The domination of
the bureaucracy is possible because of the very limited forms of public control on their activities
and the very weak forms of participation. Citizens are not involved in decision-making and the
majority of institutionalized actors are left out of the processes of local governance. Elections
are zero-sum games – winners win and losers completely loose. This situation generated the
36 Dahl, R. (1961). Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press, 186.
23
attitude of distrust to local governments expressed by both political and ethnic groups that are
underrepresented in councils and city governments.
It is widely accepted that participation is required to enhance people’s influence on decision-
making that affects their lives. There is no single meaning or model of participation - it takes
many forms. Generally, it is argued that participation is both end and means: that is both an
objective in itself and a way of achieving other objectives, such as local capacity building,
efficient management or responsive performance. Table 7 summarizes different forms of
participation. Each model possesses different degree of inclusiveness. Some of them require
setting up new institutions; others can operate under the existing institutional arrangements.
Table 7. Models of participation.
Modes of participation Process characteristics
Consultation
People are consulted about possible solutions of a problem. But the professionals define the
problem and they are not obliged to take into consideration people’s feedback.
Access
Enabling people to improve access to public services, such as health care by opening filed offices
as close to customers as possible
Input People contribute to local projects by material resources such as food, labor or cash.
Representation
People elect their representatives to run local affairs in jurisdictions possibly as small as possible.
Representatives of citizens are selected to seat on managing boards.
Interaction
People’s organizations participate in defining action plans, analysis and implementation, including
local institutional building/strengthening.
Deliberation Official authorities and peoples’ organizations set up special participatory institutions to address and
solve tangible problems.
Adapted from: Smith, B. (1993). Choices in the Design of Decentralization, London: Commonwealth Secretariat;
Prette, J. (1995). Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture. World Development, 23(8), 1247-1263.
The Ideal types of participatory models described above are hard to find in practice in pure
forms. Rather, the different types are always mixed and combined. The main distinguishing
factor is whether institutionalized collective interest is a necessary condition,. (I am not sure
about this sentence, Zs. E.) For example, the consultation and input models may not require
institutionalization of collective interests and may be used even in purely atomized communities.
The access and representation models refer to the top-down process, i.e. governments try to
bring public institutions closer to the citizens. Collective interests may or may not be
institutionalized in these cases, i.e. the decision may be a mere expression of government’s
good will or may be a result of pressure from the groups. Interaction and deliberation implies
that is a two-way process: governments have a will to devolve more power and citizens make
pressure to receive more rights. These models require that collective interests are
institutionalized, i.e. there is a well- developed set of medium institutions such as associations
of citizens. From this view, interaction and deliberation are the highest forms of participation
enabling actors to express and defend their defined interests in cooperation with other actors.
But these models are also hardest to achieve, as it requires democratic government and
institutionalized interests outside the government’s control.
As it was mentioned above, participation is mean and end, or both value and mission. But in
practice the introduction of a participatory model is almost always associated with either general
value or certain concrete mission. Generally, in countries of well-established democratic
traditions participatory models developed through decades and are considered as end aims, i.e.
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it has a value in itself, without counting its pros and cons. This approach can take both
individualized and institutionalized forms, i.e. participation of individual actors are as valuable as
of institutionalized actors. In countries where democracy is less advanced or there are
conflicting parties, participatory models tend to have clearly defined missions. Participation
model tries to involve well-organized and institutionalized interests to achieve tangible
objectives, such as transparency, peace building or economic growth. A good example of the
mission-oriented participatory model is the system of Northern Irish Partnerships that has made
significant contribution to the peace building process between the two conflicting communities.37
In addition to mission/value dichotomy participatory models can be either individualized or
collective. The individualized model focuses on individuals and treats them as legitimate actors
in the decision-making process. For this model authorities and individuals are equal partners, no
medium institutions are required to direct or manage citizens’ access to governance process.
The collective model gives an additional dimension to participation – citizens are treated not
only as individual identities, but also as institutional identities. This model admits that an
individual can not be equal partner of institutionalized authority structures. Therefore, the focus
is on the medium institutions, which enables individuals to congregate interests by means of
formalized association. Such a model officially recognizes that together with governments there
are other organized and institutionalized actors that should have voice in decision-making.
Examples of this model are named as corporatism, concertation, deliberative poliarchy, etc.
Table 8 offers classification of participatory models using value-mission and individual-
institutional differences.
Table 8. Typology of participatory models
Collective Individualized
Mission oriented
o Deliberation
o Interaction
o Input
o Access
Value oriented
o Representation o Consultation
Georgian legislation proposes several mechanisms for citizens’ participation. These
mechanisms are outlined in organic law on Local Government and Administration and in
Administrative Code. According to these principles citizens can attend public meetings, can
request information from public organizations and can initiate bills or regulations on council
meetings. Public organizations are obliged to announce well in advance about the date, time
and agenda of the meeting. Public organizations can not close meetings without substantial
reasoning. If they do so the decision loses legal power.
According to the classification model outlined above the Georgian legislation offers value
oriented individualized model of participation. The model does not work for several reasons:
First, value oriented individualized participation model implies that individual rights are so well
protected by the state that an individual can oppose powerful bureaucracies if his or her rights
are violated. In practice, as it was shown in previous sections, the bureaucracy is a very
powerful actor and one can not expect that it is willing to share the power with other powerless
actors. Second, medium institutions such as non-governmental, business, and professional
associations are not well developed. Such institutions do exist, but they tend to be based on the
individuals and serve individual interests rather than to the aggregated interests of many
individuals. Because the legislation fails to offer mechanisms of participation via the medium
institutions, actors outside the government are marginalized or eventually merged into the
governmental structures.
37 NIVT (1999). Communities in Transuition. The Challenge of Peace Building. Belfast: NIVT
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What preconditions are necessary for the participatory model to be successful? To answer this
question we need a case of successful participatory model. Such case is the model called
participatory budgeting launched by the winning left-wing political party in Porto Alegre city,
Brazil. The idea of the participatory budgeting model is to undermine a clentelistic allocation of
public resources and to base the budgeting on the actual needs of the citizens. The process of
discussion over the budget is done in several steps and is brought to citizens as close as
possible. The discussions are organized in the sixteen administrative districts of the city. In each
district Regional Plenary Assemblies meet twice a year. Participants of the assembly are
representatives of city government, neighborhood associations, youth and health clubs. The
process starts with discussing the implementation of the prior year’s budget. The assembly
elects delegates to have regular meetings to define spending priorities for the following year.
The delegates hold regular meetings in neighborhoods and discuss possible projects, which the
city might fund in the region. After these discussions the delegates report back to the Assembly
with a budget proposal. The assembly approves the proposal and elects two delegates to
participate in the city budget discussion on the Participatory Budgeting Council. The council is at
the city level and is composed by the delegates from each of the regional assemblies, elected
delegates from the city government, delegates from workers’ union, neighborhood associations
and municipal agencies. The council approves the municipal budget that maximally corresponds
to the needs of local population. Approved budget is submitted to the Mayor, which either
accepts the budget or uses his veto power and returns the proposal back to the council. The
council can either amend the budget or over-ride the veto by 2/3 of votes.38
The main lesson from participatory model described above is that the success of a participatory
model is determined by several preconditions: (1) the presence of political will of official
authorities to make the decision-making process more inclusive; (2) the presence of developed
medium institutions able to articulate and protect collective interests; (3) the practical orientation
of the model. That is, the actors involved know what should be achieved from the participatory
model and can measure the success against the clearly defined objectives. Next part of the
paper suggests that the participatory model in Georgia must rely upon these three
preconditions.39
A way forward: the main conclusions and recommendations
The paper analyzed formal and informal power structures of the Georgian local government.
The analysis reveled that local policy domains were largely controlled by the powerful cliques
composed of the bureaucrats and private actors. The latest institutional changes transformed
the ties between the local government and bureaucratic cliques. These changes were reflected
in the policy outcomes of local governments. That is, local governments performed differently
depending on the structure of policy networks operating at the local policy domains. Yet, the
institutional change did not affect the level of inclusiveness in non-homogenous communities.
Thinking about the further reform of local governance several factors must be taken into
consideration: (1) formal structures of local governments play subordinated roles in managing
local affairs; (2) non-governmental sector tends to merge with the public sector; (3) large groups
in the non-homogenous municipalities have no mechanisms to participate in the decision-
making.
38 For fuller description of the Porto Alegre participatory case see: Avritzer, L. (1999) Public Deliberation at the Local Level:
Participatory Budgeting in Brazil; Baiocchi, G. (1999) participation, Activism, and politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment and
Deliberative democratic Theory (http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RealUtopias.htm
39 Fung and Write name this model as Empowered Deliberative Democracy. The outline of its main principles can be found at:
Fung, A. Wright, E.O. (2000) Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered participatory Government
(http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/fung/deepening_democracy.pd)
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The problem of inclusiveness can not be addressed by a single player in the local policy
domains. It requires combined and coordinated endeavor of a number of actors: local
governments, central government, non-governmental sector and international aid organizations.
But the role of the central government remains central as it carries the ultimate responsibility of
creating a functional local government. The latest institutional reform opens a window of
opportunity for the government to successfully complete the process of devolution. As it was
described above, a formal institutional change has a potential of changing policy networks and
hence, changing policy outcomes. The recommended action could be summarized into three
main steps:
Fiscal decentralization. Why are the bureaucratic cliques so powerful? Why is it so important to
maintain connections with this clique to manage local affairs? Why do non-governmental
organizations try to merge with the public sector? The answer lies in incomplete fiscal
decentralization, i.e. political devolution is not accompanied with fiscal autonomy. The
bureaucratic clique still remains in charge of the public money and other actors’ success
depends on the connections with these cliques. Therefore, the completion of the fiscal
decentralization process will brake ties between the bureaucratic and local government cliques
on the one hand and between the non-governmental and public sectors on the other. Thus,
local governments should be given more financial autonomy by increasing their revenue basis
and taxation power. Many interest groups such as association of local government experts and
young economists’ association have been advocating for these changes for several years.
According to a draft prepared by them, several taxes with predictable and stable revenues
should be allocated to local governments.40
Giving greater financial autonomy to local governments may have both positive and negative
effects. The positive effect is that different actors in local policy domains may find common
interests – spending of the funds according to local needs. The negative consequence may be
that the bureaucrats who lost control over the localities may invade local governments and may
legitimize their power and influence through local elections. These negative consequences can
be dealt with by the introduction of coherent participatory models. Thus, local governments
should be given legal rights and obligations to involve local groups in decision-making. For
example, like the Porto Alegre case the local governments may be required to create
participatory budgeting boards, which will include representatives of different interest groups in
the municipalities. In this model the local government is only one of the actors and not the only
actor. It maintains the role of arbiter or mediator among the variety of interests.
As mentioned above, the non-governmental sector is closely tied to the interests articulated by
the international donors. They find it difficult to address the needs of citizens. As a result, non-
governmental organizations fail to mobilize and represent citizen’s interests. Thus the institution
lacks the main feature – ability to act as medium between the government and the public. The
problem can be addressed by granting to the non-governmental organizations the right on
procurements. That is the government must recognize that citizens’ organizations are legitimate
actors that must be in charge of some portion of public money to undertake certain portion of
services that are currently delivered by the public structures.
The reform consisting of three main components – fiscal decentralization, empowering civic
sector, introduction of participatory models – is a continuous and perhaps never-ending
process. It may have effects not only for local, but also for national policies. Georgian state is
frequently called a failed state because of its inability to cope with the private interests and
involve different communities in the policy-making process. Giving more rights to local
governments, empowering non-governmental sector and introducing participatory models may
create a solid precondition for better governance at all levels of government.
40 Conference organized by the Association of Local Government Experts, Tbilisi, February 2003 (Unpublished materials).
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